North Korean leader Kim Jong-il has traveled to China. He appears likely to follow his own path, but some who believe North Korea is responsible for the sinking of the Cheonan are liable to think that he will be relying on China to avoid
responsibility. Whatever the case, there is scant chance of the Cheonan being the main item on the agenda of a North Korea-China summit. More pressing issues exist between the two countries, namely resuming six-party talks and stronger political and economic cooperation. If they reach a compromise between their demands, the effects will come to reach South Korea some time down the road.
The point of concern amid these circumstances is the atmosphere in South Korea, where everything is revolving around the Cheonan disaster. It would be one thing if it had been demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt that the incident was North Korea’s doing. The Lee Myung-bak government’s attitude of pushing through domestic and international policy predicted on a North Korean attack theory, even though this has not been confirmed, is a grave potential risk even if one leaves aside the issue of feasibility. That is to say nothing about the
possibility of political motives operating on top of this.
In fact, the Cheonan is not the only thing that has sunk. I am not referencing the military and ruling government’s loss of public trust due to factors such as a
sloppy response to the disaster and an attitude that suggests something is being
concealed. For such factors, any number of measures could be taken. Trust can
be recovered if the parties candidly acknowledge their mistakes and devise some
kind of self-reform. Whatever the cause, the tears of the bereaved family
members belong to all of us.
It is the sinking of inter-Korean relations that is another story. Despite several
announcements from North Korea that it was confiscating or freezing all South
Korean assets in the Mt. Kumgang area, the Lee Myung-bak administration has
essentially ignored the whole issue as it unfolded. The future is now unclear even
for the last remaining project of inter-Korean economic cooperation, the Kaesong
Industrial Complex. One could say that the Lee Myung-bak administration’s North
Korea policy, which has talked up mutual benefits and prosperity for the future,
but in reality pursued antagonism and pressure while anticipating an upheaval,
has nearly arrived at its final destination. The timely occurrence of the Cheonan
disaster seems to create a plausible pretext, but the sinking of inter-Korean
relations will deal greater damage to South Korea, which has a wider array of
issues to deal with than an already isolated North Korea.
Another sinking point is the “Lee Myung-bak style of pragmatism.” President Lee
has advocated so-called “pragmatic centrism.” This is a declaration that out of the various branches of conservatives, he will take as his principal base the wing of economic conservatives who value the pursuit of profits. It also means that he
will be keeping a certain distance from the national security conservatives who
established themselves as the most persistent vested interests in South Korean
society within the Cold War structure. Indeed, if pragmatic centrism is to be
adopted, it can only happen in this way. It is an issue of a completely different
dimension from reverting to military government-style authoritarianism in the
social arena out of shock at the candlelight vigil demonstrations early in his term.
But since the Cheonan disaster, the president has led the way in espousing hard-
line national security conservatism. He merely appeared somewhat cautious in the early stages, however, since then he has been at the center of the effort to stir up national security concerns.
Not all points of sinking are the same. The Cheonan’s sinking occurred suddenly
and unexpectedly, but the others will be determined by conscious choice. As such, their repercussions are different, as are the appropriate measures to take. If an objective study shows that North Korea was or was not involved in the Cheonan disaster, suitable measures should be taken accordingly. In either, we should naturally distinguish between what we can and cannot do, what we must and must not do. We have more to lose than to gain from constructing a flawed
framework and trying to drag other countries into it.
As such, a dispassionate attitude is crucially needed. South Korea’s voice on
issues related to the Korean Peninsula is already weak. Having lost all leverage
against North Korea with the sinking of inter-Korean relations, we now find
ourselves forced to depend entirely on the U.S. and China. China will enjoy this
turn of events, in the name of balanced diplomacy, while the U.S., which has to
resolve the nuclear problem, will ultimately match its step with China’s. This
situation becomes even more serious with the widening gulf between the
atmosphere in South Korea and the international environment. Regardless of the
results of Kim Jong-il‘s visit to China, the Cheonan disaster casts a far greater
shadow on South Korea than it does on North Korea.
http://www.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=419356
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